​Precautionary Savings in China: the Role of Health Shocks (JMP)

Abstract: We study the policy effect of the health shocks on the savings from the perspective of the prepayment of the medical expenses with heterogeneous agents and endogenous mortality rate. We found that rich agents are not affected by the prepayment while the saving patterns of the poor agents change significantly. Using the the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data and performing the counterfactual experiment, we found the savings of the poor are four times higher than the case with no prepayment. In total, the savings will increase by more than 13%. This not only shed light to the savings in China that the poor people will save more to prepare for the prepayment to reduce the mortality rate but also provided a lower bound to the Chinese savings considering larger fraction of poor people compared the United States.

Migration, Fertility, and Inequality in China: Why the Left-behind Children Matter

Abstract: We study the policy effect of the migration restriction which prevents the rural migrant parents from bringing their children to the urban cities in a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous migration and fertility choices and population. There are two sectors in our model and both sectors allow agents to accumulate human capital. Initial parameters satisfy the urban area is much richer than the rural part. We found that with full migration the urban individuals are not hurt but the rural agents are as well as the urban ones. In partial migration case that we focused on, we found this situation is between autarky and full migration case. The rural agents are better than the autarky but worse than the urban counterparts. In conclusion, we found that the policy restricting the rural migrant parents bring their children to the urban cities is to create an artificial gap not only the rural children are left behind but also the rural sector is left behind

Gender imbalances and Land bequests in General Equilibrium

Abstract: We study the sources of gender imbalance in a fully dynamic general
equilibrium model with marriage markets and endogenous fertility. We show that the most standard explanation for gender imbalances, preferences for sons, fails to simultaneously explain another stylized fact: that sons also inherit most of the land. We show that other standard explanations, such as market incompleteness and/or different bargaining power also fail to explain simultaneously gender imbalances and inheritance patterns. We find that the stylized facts can be explained by a model with imperfect screening technology. Parents will compensate the less boys by bequeathing more to them. Market allocations in such an economy are not Pareto efficient.